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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MOORE v. STATE: A PERSON WHO DOWNLOADS CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY USING A COMPUTER, ABSENT ANY 
INVOLVEMENT IN ITS CREATION OR DISTRIBUTION, 
DOES NOT COMMIT A FELONY IN VIOLATION OF 
SECTION 11-207(A)(3) OF THE CRIMINAL LAW ARTICLE 
By: Kate E. Stewart 
Upon its own initiative, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to 
review de novo a ruling of the circuit court, holding that a person who 
uses a computer to download visual representations of a minor 
engaged in obscene acts or sexual conduct commits a misdemeanor, 
rather than a felony. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 879 A.2d 1111 
(2005). In so holding, the Court clarified an existing felony statute 
criminalizing child pornography by finding that the legislature did not 
intend the statutory phrase "use [of] a computer to depict or describe" 
to encompass the use of a computer to download and possess. !d. 
On October 7, 2003, police served a search warrant upon Jonathan 
G. Moore ("Moore") for his residence. The police read Moore his 
Miranda rights, and he voluntarily waived them. In the search, 
detectives found a computer which Moore acknowledged as being his. 
Moore assisted the detectives in examining the computer by showing 
them a file on the computer containing photographic images and 
videos of female children under sixteen years of age engaged in sexual 
acts. The police also found computer print-outs and a floppy disk with 
pornographic images. Moore voluntarily stated that he downloaded 
the material from a website beginning in August 2003 for his personal 
use, but added that he had not created or distributed any of the images. 
Moore was indicted for violating sections 11-207(a)(3) and 11-
208(a) of the Maryland Criminal Law Article. Count I of the 
indictment charged Moore under the felony statute, § ll-207(a)(3), 
with using a computer "to depict and describe" a minor engaged in 
sexual acts. Count II charged Moore under the misdemeanor statute, 
§11-208(a), with knowingly possessing various visual representations 
of a minor engaged in sexual conduct. Moore pled not guilty to both 
counts. 
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On June 21, 2004, the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County 
convicted him of both counts of the indictment. Moore appealed to 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland solely as to his felony 
conviction under Count I. However, before the Court considered the 
case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, upon its own initiative, 
granted certiorari to resolve the correct interpretation of the language 
ofMd. Crim. Law§ 11-207(a)(3). 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by reviewing the plain 
language of the felony statute. Section 11-207(a)(3) states that a 
person may not "use a computer to depict or describe" a minor 
involved in obscene, sadomasochistic, or sexual conduct. !d. at 452, 
879 A.2d at 1114. Moore argued on appeal that the statute was 
ambiguous and his conduct did not violate the§ ll-207(a)(3) because 
the statute proscribes the creation of obscene materials using a 
computer, as evidenced by legislative history. !d. at 456, 879 A.2d at 
1116. In addition, Moore contended that the misdemeanor child 
pornography statute already criminalized the use of a computer to 
possess obscene materials. !d. at 456, 879 A.2d at 1116. 
In order to resolve any ambiguities and determine the meaning of 
the statute, the Court engaged in interpretation of the phrase "use [of] 
a computer to depict or describe" by examining the legislative intent. 
!d. at 452-53, 879 A.2d at 1114. In its examination, the Court 
considered legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. !d. at 
452-53, 879 A.2d at 1114. 
The Court began by discussing the plain language of the statute, 
observing that Webster's Dictionary defines "depict" and "describe" 
as representing by drawing, writing, or otherwise; whereas 
"download" denotes the transferring or copying of data. !d. at 457, 
879 A.2d at 1116-7. The Court stated that the ordinary usage of 
"depict" and "describe" is inconsistent with the action of downloading. 
!d. at 457, 879 A.2d at 1116-7. Thus, the Court of Appeals accepted 
Moore's understanding of the words "depict" and "describe." !d. at 
457, 879 A.2d at 1116-7. 
In addition, the Court stated that the legislature's choice to employ 
the active verb forms of the words "depict" and "describe" indicates 
legislative intent to criminalize actions involved in creating 
pornographic materials. !d. at 458, 879 A.2d 1117. When used in 
their passive form, as "depiction" or "description," the words imply a 
previously created image, as is consistent with the word choice in the 
misdemeanor statute,§ 11-208(a). !d. at 458, 879 A.2d 1117. Section 
11-208(a) prohibits possession of an image "depicting" child 
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pornography, thus prohibiting possession of an image that has already 
been depicted. Id. at 458-59, 879 A.2d at 1117-8. The misdemeanor 
statute, the Court decided, encompasses downloading because an 
image has already been depicted when a person downloads it. !d. at 
459, 879 A.2d at 1118. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals found the Illinois Legislature's 
interpretation of its own statutes instructive. !d. at 459-60, 879 A.2d 
1118. In its distinction between the verb "depict" and the passive 
tense forms - "depiction" and "depicting" - the Illinois Legislature 
defined the phrase "depict by computer" to mean "to generate or 
create ... " !d. at 459-60, 879 A.2d 1118. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland thus concluded that the plain language of the statutory 
phrase "to depict or describe" was unambiguous, and that the 
legislature intended the felony statute to proscribe the use of a 
computer to create pornographic images. !d. at 460, 879 A.2d at 
1118-9 (emphasis added). 
The Court also examined Maryland legislative history to support its 
finding. A letter from an assistant attorney general indicated that the 
statute targets child pornography producers and distributors. Id. at 
460, 879 A.2d at 1119. The Court noted that the Maryland General 
Assembly first criminalized child pornography in 1978, but mere 
possession of child pornography was not criminalized until 1992 with 
the passage of a misdemeanor statute, further evidencing legislative 
intent to target the pornography industry with the felony statute. Id. at 
462, 879 A.2d at 1120. The Court recognized that the legislature first 
addressed the use of computers in child pornography in 1996 when it 
amended what is now § 11-207(a)(3) to include, among the verbs 
"photographs" and "films," the phrase "depicts or describes," further 
implying that the statute proscribes authorship, not downloading or 
possession, of pornographic material. I d. at 446, 879 A.2d at 1122. 
By holding that a person who downloads child pornography for 
personal possession does not commit a felony, the Court of Appeals 
has effectively separated the felony and misdemeanor child 
pornography statutes by identifying the intended targets of each statute 
according to the level of involvement in child pornography. Those 
who simply possess child pornography will only be charged with a 
misdemeanor, as long as there is no evidence of distribution or 
creation of child pornography. The felony statute was intended to 
target the child pornography industry and encompasses more than 
mere possession. The Court recognized an important distinction 
between a user who only possesses child pornography and an 
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individual who promotes the child pornography industry by creating or 
distributing pornographic material. 
